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1 See e.g. http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.hIn the changing landscape of the todays Internet, several solutions are under investigation to allow effi-
cient, flexible and scalable multihoming. One of the proposals is shim6, a host-based multihoming solu-
tion based on the use of multiple IPv6 addresses on each host. In this work, we first describe the main
features of this protocol, then we explain our implementation of shim6, along with the associated secu-
rity mechanisms in the Linux kernel and, finally, we evaluate its performance. In particular, we analyse
the performance impact of the security mechanisms used by shim6 and the impact of shim6 on the per-
formance of end-host systems, especially heavily loaded servers. We conclude by discussing the remain-
ing open issues for a widespread deployment of host-based multihoming techniques such as shim6.
 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The current IPv4 Internet is facing several challenges. Firstly,
the IP version 4 (IPv4) address space is limited and the latest pro-
jections1 indicate that during the year 2011 all IPv4 addresses will
have been allocated. Secondly, operators and researchers are becom-
ing more and more concerned about the limits on the scalability of
the current Internet architecture [30].
For a number of years, several groups have tried to address
these problems. Within the IETF, the work on the development of
a replacement for IPv4 started more than 15 years ago with the
work on IP next generation. This initiated the development of IP
version 6 (IPv6) that was expected to replace IP version 4 before
the beginning of this century. Today, IPv6 is now supported by
most host and server operating systems. However deployment by
network operators is still limited but appears to have been growing
recently [24]. We can thus expect that IPv6 will gain more and
more importance over the next few years.
On the other hand, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) has
identified several limitations of the current Internet architecture
[30]. The first problem is the scalability of the interdomain routing
system. This is reflected by the growth of the BGP routing tables
and also the growth in the number of messages processed by
BGP routers. This routing scalability issue is caused by several main
factors. An initial contributor is multihoming, i.e. when an IP net-
work is attached to several Internet Service Providers that needll rights reserved.
S. Barré), jronan@tssg.org (J.
nture).
tml.to advertise the corresponding prefix to the global Internet. An-
other contributor to the growth of the BGP routing tables are the
various BGP-based traffic engineering techniques used by network
operators to control the flow of their Internet traffic [20,40]. Final-
ly, the allocation of IP addresses also contributes to the BGP
growth. In the early days of the Internet, IP address blocks were
allocated on a first-come first-served basis. This led to a huge con-
sumption of address blocks that are almost impossible to aggre-
gate. Since the introduction of Classless Interdomain Routing
(CIDR), IP address blocks are allocated by Regional Registries
(RIRs). There are two types of address block allocations: Provider
Independent (PI) and Provider Aggregatable (PA). In the early days,
PI address blocks were reserved for Internet Service Providers and
customer networks could not obtain such address blocks directly
from the RIRs. This allocation policy assumed that customer net-
works would be single homed and that they would renumber their
network each time they change provider. These assumptions do
not hold anymore and many enterprise networks insist on obtain-
ing PI address blocks, which contributes to the growth of the BGP
routing tables [29].
The second problem is the overloading of IP address semantics.
IP addresses are used for two different purposes: identifiers and
locators. In its identifier role, an IP address, combined with a port
number, identifies an endpoint of a transport flow. In its locator
role, an IP address identifies the paths to reach a host via one of
its interfaces through a network.
The large IPv6 address space offers several opportunities to
solve these problems differently than with IPv4. Several years
ago, after evaluating many alternatives [17,23], the IETF chartered
the shim6 working group to develop a host-based IPv6 multihom-
ing solution [36]. The shim6 specifications are now ready and, in
1686 S. Barré et al. / Computer Communications 34 (2011) 1685–1695this paper, we report our experience with one of the first complete
and publicly available implementations of this IPv6 multihoming
technique in the Linux kernel.
This paper is organised as follows. First, as shim6 is not yet
widely known, we describe its key features and benefits in Sec-
tion 2. This is followed by a description of the architecture of our
LinShim6 implementation in Section 3 and an evaluation of the
performance of several of its key mechanisms. We conclude by
reflecting on the evolution of host-based multihoming techniques
based on our experience with shim6 in Section 4 and a discussion
of related work in Section 5.Fig. 1. Basic operation of a shim6 host.2. Shim6 host-based IPv6 multihoming
Before delving into the details of shim6, consider that there are
at least two scenarios that can provide multihoming. The first type
is when a single host has two or more IPv6 addresses from two or
more layer-2 interfaces connected to separate networks. This can
be the case of a laptop having both WiFi and 3G Internet interfaces,
or servers having multiple Ethernet interfaces. In these cases, the
multihomed host would like to either be able to efficiently use
both interfaces simultaneously or use a primary interface, with
automatic redirection of all packets over another interface upon
failure of the primary one.
The second type of multihoming occurs when a campus, corpo-
rate or ISP network is attached to two different service providers.
In such a network, each host gets an address from each service pro-
vider, and is accessible over both. A host in such a multihomed net-
work can select, for itself, the provider to use for a given flow,
through appropriate selection of the source address. Shim6 was
designed with the latter form of multihoming in mind but also sup-
ports the former.
Today, in the IPv4 Internet, when a network is multihomed, it
receives one IPv4 address range, and uses BGP to advertise its
IPv4 prefix to its upstream providers which, in turn, advertise the
network to the global Internet. This contributes to the growth of
the BGP routing tables. If a link between the multihomed network
and one of its providers fails, BGP re-converges, to ensure that the
multihomed network remains reachable via its other providers.
However, a network relying on shim6 for its multihoming behaves
differently. The main difference from IPv4 multihoming is that
each shim6 host has several IPv6 addresses, one from each of its
providers or one on each of its interfaces. This is illustrated in
Fig. 1. The corporate network shown at the bottom of the figure
is attached to ISP1 and ISP2. Each ISP has allocated a prefix to
the corporate network. Each shim6 host has one IPv6 address in-
side each of these subnets. From a BGP routing table viewpoint,
the main advantage of shim6 host-based multihoming is that
AS1 and AS2 only need to advertise their global/32 IPv6 prefix
and not the more specific prefixes allocated to their customers.
However, this also implies that if the link between the corporate
network and ISP1 fails, BGP will not announce the failure to the
global Internet. This problem is solved in shim6 by using a new
failure detection and recovery mechanism, the REAP protocol [4],
that allows shim6 hosts to detect a failure and switch traffic to
an available working path.
In the following subsections, first we describe the shim6 archi-
tecture, then explain how shim6 solves the security issues and fi-
nally describe the REAP protocol.Fig. 2. Networking stack with shim6.2.1. Shim6
A shim6 host has several IPv6 addresses. All these addresses are
locators, i.e. they identify where a network interface is located
within the global routing context. For example, in Fig. 1, a packetwhose destination is ISP1.A will be delivered via ISP1. On the
other hand, a packet whose destination is ISP2.A will be delivered
via ISP2. As current best practice [9] recommends that ISPs verify
the source address of packets received from their customers: a
packet produced by host A that contains ISP1.A as its source ad-
dress must always be sent via ISP1. Such a packet will never be
forwarded by ISP2.
When an application on host A contacts an application on host B
using an upper-layer protocol (ULP), the default address selected
[18] by host A is determined to be the upper-layer identifier (ULID)
to identify the transport flows between the hosts. Conceptually,
the shim6 sublayer belongs to the network layer and the locators
are attached to the lower part of the network layer while the iden-
tifier is attached to the upper part of the network layer (Fig. 2).
The main purpose of shim6 is to preserve established flows in
spite of network failures, while operating transparently to upper-
layer protocols such as TCP or UDP. This is illustrated in Fig. 1. Host
A has established a flow between ULID ISP1.A and destination
ISPX.B. In addition to its ULID, host A also has the ISP2.A locator.
Upon failure of the path between ISP1.A and ISPX.B, host A will
use shim6 to switch its flow on the ISP2.A? ISPX.B path. For
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source ISP2.A. Shim6 ensures the transparency of this operation
to the applications.
The shim6 sublayer performs three different tasks. Firstly, two
communicating shim6 hosts need to discover their respective loca-
tor sets. This is performed during the establishment of the shim6
session. Secondly, during the lifetime of a flow, it may be necessary
to switch from the current path to an alternate, e.g. after a failure.
Thirdly, shim6 can be used to advertise any change in the set of
locators available on a host.
The first task is conducted at the beginning of a communication.
When an application is requested to initiate an exchange towards a
host (i.e. a http or other such request), the usual process is that its
name is looked up from the Domain Name System (DNS). The DNS
answers with one or several addresses. The application then initi-
ates a connection with one of the obtained addresses (through de-
fault address selection) [18,34,35].
A heuristic on one of the shim6-enabled hosts determines
whether it is worth the extra shim6 overhead to protect the com-
munication flow. In the case where the host decides that it is worth
the effort, the end hosts communicate to each other their entire set
of locators. This is the shim6 initial exchange. After this negotia-
tion, each host has a set of local and peer addresses that it can
use to carry packets.
The establishment of a shim6 session is performed by using a
four-way handshake as shown in Fig. 3. This handshake is based
on the handshake used by HIP [32]. It was designed [36] to protect
against replay attacks, to ensure that all announced addresses be-
long to the same peer, and to protect against Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks. More details about how and why the messages are
exchanged this manner are available in [36, Section 7]. However,
to understand this paper, it is sufficient to know that the most
costly operation in a shim6 negotiation (in terms of processing
power) is the address signature (which can be done in advance
or offline) and verification. These operations are explained in the
next subsection.
Typically the second task is triggered when the associated REAP
protocol has detected a failure and found an alternate working
locator pair. More generally, any appropriately interfaced entity
(an application interface for example [27]) could trigger a path
change. Changing the path in the course of a communication is
made possible by rewriting the address pair in use. Obviously
one particular path is the one corresponding to the ULIDs. In this
case the ULIDs and the locators are identical and no rewriting is
needed. In all other cases, rewriting is needed and an extensionFig. 3. Shim6 session establishment.header is added to the outgoing packets. The extension header con-
tains a context tag used to identify the flow at the receiver, so that
locators can be replaced by the correct ULIDs in the receiver.
The rewriting function of shim6 is located in a new IP-sublayer
in the networking stack, as shown in Fig. 2. Anything located above
the shim6 layer sees stable addresses (ULIDs). This includes parts
of the IP layer such as IPsec or fragmentation, so that those func-
tions can operate on stable ULIDs, even though shim6 may have
had to rewrite the packet header. Conversely, the forwarding func-
tionality of the IP layer must be located below the shim6 layer, so
that the locators chosen by shim6 are correctly used to select a
path. The effect of address rewriting over the chosen path is illus-
trated in Fig. 1.
The third task is locator update. This is useful if a new locator
appears after the initial exchange, that is, after the set of locators
has been announced by each peer. This could happen should an-
other Ethernet or WiFi interface become operational. If a locator
appears or disappears on a host, it is possible to tell the peer about
an updated locator set, so that changes in available paths are taken
into account. These locator updates may be useful in some IP
mobility scenarios [41].
In task one, we briefly mention the use of cryptographic mech-
anisms. These mechanisms have been carefully designed [36] to
prevent an attacker from injecting fake addresses, and thus use this
attack vector as a basis for new types of attacks. We summarize the
critical parts in the next subsection, and address them in more de-
tail later in the paper.
2.2. Securing locator sets
A key problem faced by host-based techniques that rely on mul-
tiple locators is that the receiver of that packet must be able to ver-
ify the origin of a packet that uses a new locator. RFC4218 [37]
describes in details the threats that must be considered while
designing any IPv6 multihoming solution. The way shim6 re-
sponds to those attacks is described in section 16 of [36]. While
the solution to many of the threats resides in using well-known
protection mechanisms, one particular type of attack, namely ad-
dress injection, is addressed by a new mechanism that is worth
describing here. Address injection consists of an attacker present-
ing a modified address set to one of the communicating hosts
(either by sending fake announcements or modifying existing
packets).
The first option proposed by [36] to solve this issue is to use
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) [6]. This method
relies on the use of a signature to prove that all signed addresses
have been generated by the same entity. Rather than using certif-
icates to bind an identity to the signature (which would require a
trusted third-party to sign the certificate), the CGA approach is to
bind the ULID itself to the signature. For a given public/private
key pair, the private key is used to sign the locator set, while the
public key is hashed so as to generate the 64 low order bits of
the ULID. The length of the hash is artificially extended (see [6])
so that the actual hash length is not 64 bits, but instead
59 + 16 ⁄ sec bits (where sec is a tunable parameter). Consequently,
the security is dependent on an attacker not being able to find a
hash collision with a self-generated public key. This property of
the hash function is called ‘‘pre-image resistance’’, and the time
needed to find a collision when the sec parameter is as low as 1
makes such an attack infeasible in short timescales. Over time,
when Moores law does eventually make such an attack practical,
or for servers that keep a stable address over time, the attack com-
plexity can be increased further by incrementing the security
parameter (sec) on the host that generates the signature [6]. With
each increase in the security parameter, the complexity required
to generate a collision will increase by 216⁄sec iterations. This in-
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tacks, while keeping the cost of address verification constant.
The second option is to bind all addresses together, without
using a signature. This type of address is called Hash Based Ad-
dresses (HBA) [7]. The 64 low order bits of each address is the re-
sult of a hash computation over all the prefixes of the set. An
attacker who wishes to inject his own address into the locator
set would need to find an input to the hash function that produces,
at least, the locator used for forwarding as part of the generated
locator set. Since this is made easier by the short length of the hash,
HBA uses the same security parameter as CGA to tune the crypto-
graphical strength of the locator set.
HBA is computationally cheaper than CGA, but it also has less
flexibility. Its main drawback is that the addition of a new address
in a locator set requires regenerating the whole set. This is where
CGA-compatible HBA addresses are useful. In that case the hash in-
put includes both a public key and the set of prefixes. This is ini-
tially seen by the peer as normal HBA addresses, but if a new
prefix must be added afterwards, it can be signed with the public
key.
With both these mechanims in place, shim6, as part of the ini-
tial context establishment, verifies that the host claiming to be rep-
resenting ISP2.A (for example, see Fig. 3) can be cryptographically
tied to that locator (using either the CGA or HBA mechanisms).
While an attacker can generate a new address from a subnet prefix
and a public key, this attacker cannot impersonate another hosts
address. This is, of course, based on the premise that it is currently
beyond the capability of an attacker to harness enough computing
power to generate a collision in either the HBA or CGA hash
functions.2.3. Failure detection and recovery
REAP is responsible for suggesting to shim6 when to change the
current path, as well as for finding an alternate path when the cur-
rent one becomes unavailable. REAP is closely tied to shim6 be-
cause it uses its state to monitor the active flows. REAP can be
divided in two main features: Flow monitoring and path exploration.
Flow monitoring is started immediately after the shim6 initial
locator discovery. It is designed in such a way as to minimise the
amount of active probing. The main mechanism that allows for
reaching that goal is called Forced Bidirectional Detection (FBD).
The communication is forced to be bidirectional in the sense that
if an end-host receives Upper Layer Protocol (ULP) data, but does
not send anything, then control packets (keepalives) are automat-
ically generated. Given this, it can be concluded that a failure has
occurred if a host is sending ULP packets without receiving back
any data or keepalives.2 A host decides that a failure has occurred
if its Send Timer expires. The default expiry time Tsend is defined
as 15 s in [4]. That timer is stopped whenever a packet enters the
networking stack. In addition to the Send timer, a host maintains a
Keepalive Timer, that sends a keepalive packet on expiry. This is to
ensure that the peer does not think that a failure occurred when in
fact the application just stopped sending data. The requirement for
a Keepalive Timer is to have an expiry time that verifies Tka + one 
way delay < TSend. Currently we set Tka as one third of Tsend, as rec-
ommended in [4].
The second feature of REAP is path exploration. Due to its flow
monitoring capability, REAP can react to failures by probing the
known paths (address combinations). The probing process, de-
scribed in detail in [4], allows for finding an alternate working
path, for each direction of the communication. It can even result2 Note that the number of control packets is kept minimal since no keepalive is
needed if data exchange is either bidirectional or paused.in the use of different paths for each direction, as it is able to detect
unidirectional paths.3. Implementation
In this section, we first describe the architecture of our Lin-
Shim6 implementation. Then we use measurements to evaluate
its performance and motivate some of our design choices. We also
take into account related simulation-based studies [15], and pro-
vide further insight on those results based on our implementation.3.1. Architecture overview
We have explained already that shim6 is transparent to appli-
cations, however, it should also be economical with system re-
sources. While any implementation will, of necessity, consume
resources, efforts to minimise this have been made in LinShim6.
This means that special care was taken with parameters that
may impact performance. Those parameters are mainly identified
as per-packet processing, state management and cryptographic oper-
ations. In this section we describe each of those parameters and the
approach taken for the LinShim6 implementation. Note that the
following explanations are based on Figs. 4 and 5. While Fig. 4
shows the module interconnections, Fig. 5 clarifies the particular
ations undertaken by each of them (described below), based on a
common scenario.
Considering the separation between kernel space and user
space, per-packet processing must be kept in the kernel, as doing
otherwise would be very expensive in terms of performance,
requiring a context switch for each packet that enters or leaves
the system. On the other hand, state management and cryptographic
operations are better placed in user space, to allow for ease of main-
tenance and to avoid kernel bloat.
Per-packet processing can itself be further sub-divided into
shim6 trigger heuristic, REAP flow monitoring and address rewriting.
For efficiency reasons, all three functions are implemented in the
kernel. The shim6 trigger heuristic uses the Netfilter hooks
IP6_LOCAL_IN and IP6_LOCAL_OUT. However, LinShim6 does
not initiate a new shim6 session each time a packet is sent to a
new destination. For each new flow, a shim6 negotiation is trig-
gered if either Trigger bytes of data have passed (we suggest a de-
fault of Trigger = 2 KB based on our measurements), or one minute
has elapsed with data flowing between two hosts. These values
were chosen because they avoid engaging shim6 unless the data
flow is either significantly large, or of long enough duration to war-
rant it. REAP flow monitoring and address rewriting both use the
xfrm framework. This framework [49] allows for ease of integra-
tion of new layers in the networking stack. xfrm (meaning trans-
form) is designed to allow efficient support for multiple
transformations of packets in any order. Originally created for IP-
sec, where packets must be modified according to certain policies,
this framework was later used for Mobile IPv6. In LinShim6 we de-
fined a new type of xfrm transformer, capable of rewriting ad-
dresses, inserting the shim6 extension header and detecting
failures. Furthermore, we have implemented a variant of LinShim6,
called Multipath LinShim6, that handles several paths simulta-
neously. We use a more efficient approach for this than the one
proposed in [36]. [36] defines a concept of context forking, which
consists of using one fork of the original Shim6 state per additional
path that an application wants to use simultaneously with the first
one. This is costly because each additional context needs to be
negotiated and occupies space in the system, mostly duplicated
from the original context. Instead, our Multipath LinShim6 adds
only a few lines of code in the kernel (compared to pure LinShim6)
to give the xfrm entity the knowledge of all paths, and attaching a
Fig. 4. Shim6 overall architecture.
Fig. 5. LinShim6 example sequence diagram.
3 Address generation could potentially be done on a completely separate, more
powerful machine.
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layer (transport or application) can then impose a particular path
to Shim6 by attaching a path index to each outgoing packet. An
application of Multipath LinShim6 is described in [46, Section 4].
State management is actually the shim6 control plane. It starts a
shim6 negotiation when asked by the shim6 trigger heuristic.
When notified about a failure by the xfrm module, it starts a REAP
exploration, and informs the xfrm transformer when a new path
has been found, so that the corresponding address rewriting can
be performed by the kernel. If a new path is discovered (new prefix
available on an interface), it updates the peer host with this
information.
Finally, the last task performed by LinShim6 are the crypto-
graphic operations. These functions are the most costly from a
CPU viewpoint, and must be done as much as possible in advance.Cryptographic operations include the generation and verification
of addresses, as well as signing and verification of important shim6
messages. In the LinShim6 design, a separate tool allows for CGA/
HBA address generation.3 The tool can be configured to favour either
speed of address generation, versus the strength of generated ad-
dresses, incurring extra computational cost for the latter. Also, ad-
dress generation can optionally be run on a configurable number
of parallel processor threads, thus taking advantage of multi-core
processors. Much of this address generation code was originally
written by DoCoMo [25] for SEcure Neighbour Discovery [3], it
was integrated into LinShim6 for the purposes of address generation,
4 By default LinShim6 will generate CGA addresses on installation.
1690 S. Barré et al. / Computer Communications 34 (2011) 1685–1695and thus it is very similar to the SEND implementation, although our
tool features HBA generation as well.
Also, for the purposes of LinShim6, the xfrm framework has
been extended by adding the possibility to link two xfrm states
that correspond to the two uni-directional communication paths
of a data flow. A lookup method based on the context tag has also
been added. Details on the working of xfrm and our extensions can
be found in [12].
3.2. HBA/CGA
CGA and HBA addresses, which are used to secure shim6, are an
integral part of the protocol. At the time of writing and to the best
of our knowledge, LinShim6 is the only implementation with full
support of HBA and CGA. Supporting these addresses raises opera-
tional and performance challenges. From a performance viewpoint,
using CGA and HBA addresses may lower the performance of
shim6 when compared to normal IPv6. HBA and CGA operations
are the most computationally costly parts of LinShim6. We evalu-
ate here the computational impact of using those addresses, first at
the generation time (can be done offline), then at the signature and
generation time (always online).
HBA/CGA address generation: As the CGA addresses depend on
a public/private key pair, our implementation automatically gener-
ates such a key-pair during its installation. This is done so that Lin-
Shim6 will work ‘‘out-of-the-box’’, without complex configuration
effort from the user. LinShim6 configures itself automatically with
CGA addresses by using this public/private key-pair. It is, of course,
perfectly possible to manually configure several public/private key
pairs, and also to define any number of HBA-sets. For LinShim6, as
CGA addresses can be generated as soon as the host discovers the
IPv6 prefix for a network interface, we selected CGA addresses as
the default. This implies that CGA addresses are useable on laptops
that move regularly, whereas HBA’s are not for reasons mentioned
previously in Section 2.2.
As explained in [6], the cost of the CGA generation is of 216⁄sec
iterations in the worst case, where sec is the security parameter
(a larger sec increases the security but also the time required to
generate an address). The same worst case cost applies to HBA gen-
eration [7]. The worst case complexity for an attacker to find a
matching hash for the address is of the order of 259 + 16⁄sec itera-
tions [6], which means that the generator has 259 iterations of an
advantage in computational cost over the attacker. That said, in
general, as processing power increases one should consider
increasing the value of the security parameter to protect against
brute-force attacks.
To evaluate the cost of generating HBA and CGA addresses, we
used a Sunblade x6440 equipped with 4 AMD Opteron 8431 pro-
cessors, each with 6 cores, clocked at 2.4 GHz. Fig. 6 shows the
mean time required to generate HBA or CGA addresses, each bar
being the mean of 100 trials. Each bar shows the mean generation
time of two addresses, in log scale. The first two sets of bars are
generated with a security parameter of 1. The other bars were gen-
erated with a security parameter of 2. It is worth noting that the
standard deviation (not shown in the figure) is very large, because
of the brute-force algorithm [6] used in the generation process. For
the results presented in Fig. 6, we observed a standard deviation
ranging from 23% to 77% of the reported mean.
The address generation tool [25] is able to use any number of
concurrent threads. This capability was retained and extended in
order to support HBA. With the security parameter set to 2, mul-
tithreading is necessary in order to obtain a result in a reasonable
time. Hence using a security parameter of 1 is the only option on
current commodity hardware. When the computational time in-
creases due to a required higher security level, it is clearly benefi-
cial to use as many threads as possible (see the results with 8threads in the figure, and note that the scale is logarithmic). On
the other hand, multithreading gives slightly worse results when
the security parameter is 1, because the threading overhead takes
a higher proportion of the processing time.
While Fig. 6 shows the generation time for two addresses, we
note that if the number of generated addresses is increased, the
CGA generation time increases linearly with the number of ad-
dresses. On the other hand, there is a barely perceptible increase
in HBA generation time. This is because the expensive part (called
modifier generation in [6]) is conducted only once for the whole set,
in the HBA case.
Address signature and verification: Both operations take place
during the initialisation of a shim6 exchange, or when one of the
peers announces changes in its locator set. To evaluate the cost
of these cryptographical operations we measured the time needed
to carry a shim6 negotiation with different security mechanisms.
These tests were performed between two hosts on a 100 Mbps
Ethernet. The initiator was a Pentium 4 dual core, 2.6 GHz with
1 GB RAM while the responder was a Pentium 3, 600 MHz with
256 MB RAM.
The results are reported in Fig. 7. For each security configura-
tion, the case of each peer announcing 2, 5 or 10 addresses in its
locator set is compared. The negotiation time is defined as the time
elapsed between the transmission of the first I1 message, and the
reception of the last negotiation message (R2) (see Fig. 3). Note
that the negotiation time includes two signatures and two verifica-
tions, that is, one for each peer. Each bar shows the median nego-
tiation time over 20 consecutive runs.
Looking at the right hand side of Fig. 7, we note that there is a
strong correlation between the length of the RSA key used for sign-
ing messages and the negotiation time. Conversely, HBA addresses
involve a negotiation time that is almost the same as if no security
were used at all. This is because no signature is needed in the case
of HBA addresses.
An important consideration, discussed previously, is that HBA
addresses require the knowledge of all the prefixes before com-
mencing a shim6 negotiation. This motivates the use of CGA-
compatible HBA addresses which are defined in [7]. While pure
HBA addresses use a random number as input of the SHA-1 hash
used during the generation process, CGA-compatible HBA ad-
dresses use a public key instead of such a number. However, no
signature is needed until the host learns of a new prefix that can
be used. At this point a CGA address is generated based on the
new prefix, and the key used to generate the previous HBA set. A
signed message can be sent to the peer, which will use the already
known public key to verify the locator update. In Fig. 7, the bar la-
belled hbacompat shows the negotiation time needed when an HBA
set generated based on a 1024-bit public key is used.
This shows very similar results to the use of pure HBA. The
small increase in time is explained by the fact that pure-HBA uses
a random number formatted as a 384-bit RSA key, as defined in [7].
A final observation is that the impact of the number of announced
addresses (2, 5 or 10 in the figure) is insignificant compared to the
security mechanism used.
From the above observations, we conclude that from a perfor-
mance point of view, there is a strong argument to be made for
using HBA addresses, or even better, CGA-compatible HBA ad-
dresses. LinShim6 allows for generation of HBA/CGA addresses in
advance of their use.4 Once they are generated, they become active
only when configured in the system, either manually or by auto-
configuration through the cgad daemon. By default, LinShim6 dis-
ables the standard IPv6 auto-configuration mechanism, in order to
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Fig. 7. HBA/CGA evaluation.
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tens for Router Advertisements, and configures the appropriate ad-
dresses when a new prefix is received.
3.3. Improving failure recovery time
The REAP Failure detection mechanism has been evaluated by
simulations in [15]. We have evaluated the performance of the
implemented path exploration mechanism in [11]. In [15], de la
Oliva et al. emphasise that the TCP exponential backoff has a neg-
ative impact on the recovery time seen by an application. The rea-
son is that after a failure, TCP tries to retransmit until a response is
received. The delay between successive retransmissions is expo-
nentially increased. Consequently, when REAP finds a new path,
TCP unnecessarily waits for its next retransmission before noticing
that the communication path is operational again. [15] suggests
informing TCP when a new path is found so that it immediately
retransmits and recovers. Fig. 7 of [15] provides simulation results
that show the effect of the improvement.
In LinShim6, the authors have added a mechanism that allows
for notifications to be issued when any multihoming event occurs.
This uses the Linux netevent framework. Any module in the ker-
nel can register for such notifications, without the knowledge of
the shim6 module. This is important for maintaining the layer sep-
aration inside the kernel. TCP thus registers for the PATH_UPDATE
event, and receives a notification when a path has been updated.
It reacts by resetting all its RTO (Retransmission TimeOut) timersfor the TCP sessions that use that path. LinShim6 is also modular
enough to support external control from informed entities (such
as network monitoring daemons), for example to force a change
to another path. One of us (Ronan) has written such a controlling
daemon to take ECN information into account [42].
We tested that implementation in our testbed consisting of a
Juniper M10i, as the router, with two Dual Pentium III Blade serv-
ers with 512 MB of Ram and Gigabit Interfaces (Fig. 8). Both com-
puters were running the IPerf tool for traffic generation. To
simulate link failures, links were switched off in the Juniper router
via expect scripts. The gain in recovery time is presented in Fig. 9.
This figure is deliberately very similar to Fig. 7 of [15]. The goal was
to compare the simulation results with the implementation results.
We measure the Application Recovery Time (ART), defined in [15]
as the time elapsed between the last packet reception before a fail-
ure, and the first packet received after the recovery. The measure-
ment is repeated for different values of TSend (Failure detection
timeout). Each point in the figure is the median of 45 measure-
ments performed in the same conditions. Errorbars with percen-
tiles 5 and 95 are also shown.
With our testbed setup, an Application Recovery Time (ART)
cannot be below Tsend, because the time of the last packet received
is almost equal to the time of the last packet sent (due to the con-
figured packet rate), and the path exploration starts Tsend seconds
after the last packet has been sent. In the more general case the
lower bound for an ART can be slightly lower as explained in [15].
Fig. 9 confirms the simulation results from [15]. We observe an
ART that increases linearly with Tsend if the RTO (TCP Retransmis-
sion TimeOut) is reset. On the other hand, in the absence of RTO re-
set, we observe steps in the curve that are due to TCP waiting for its
RTO before performing a retransmission.
Regarding the path exploration, our implementation separates
the address pairs used for sending probes into two sets, each one
randomised. The first set contains all pairs that are completely dis-
tinct from the current (stalled) address pair. The second set con-
tains all other address pairs. The first probes sent use address
pairs from the first set, in the hope that using an orthogonal path
increases the chance our implementation can find a working path
on the first attempt. Indeed, in the testbed setup, this proved to be
the case. This also confirms what was simulated in [15].
While many things are common between our figure and Fig. 7 of
[15], all our experiments (either with or without RTO reset) reveal
a faster ART than the one obtained in [15]. One explanation is that
while [15] sends a probe to the current address pair before actually
triggering an exploration, our implementation begins exploration
immediately upon expiration of the Send timer.
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Fig. 10. I2 generation time under high load.
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ration process, is useful when there is some doubt about the fail-
ure. For example, a host could receive a spoofed ICMP
destination unreachable message, which should trigger a probe
on the current pair, but not an exploration. This is so that the host
can attempt to detect whether it was a genuine ICMP message or
not. In our instance of Fig. 9 and Fig. 7 of [15], there is a timer ex-
piry that indicates that no traffic has been seen during Tsend sec-
onds. Since REAP ensures (through keepalives) that the Tsend
timer expires only when there is truly a network failure, we argue
that this is a sufficient condition to immediately start the path
exploration, with the benefit of lowering the ART.
3.4. Cost of state maintenance
Shim6 requires state to be maintained at both the initiator (cli-
ent) and responder (server). Obviously servers usually manage
many connections simultaneously, this would then mean that a
server could potentially have to manage many shim6 contexts.
In order to reduce the load on a server, it may be preferable to dis-
able the LinShim6 heuristic. i.e. the context establishment trigger
mechanism. That way, the server will never initiate a shim6 nego-
tiation, but only respond to context creation requests from clients.
The first step of a shim6 context initialisation would be the send-
ing of an I1 message by the client. The server would reply with an
R1 without creating state. Finally the client would send an I2, at
which point context state would be created in the server. The I2
message holds the list of locators from the client, secured with a
signature that the server is required to verify. If the I2 message is
found to be valid, the server would then create a new context,
and reply with an R2 message containing it’s own signed locator
set. As the locators of a server generally do not change all that of-
ten, our implementation computes the signatures in advance, in
order to spare computing time during the context negotiation.In our testbed (the same one as used to generate Fig. 7), we
evaluated the I2 processing time, the results of which can be seen
in Fig. 10. Our tests consisted of the following. Every 50 ms, a client
initiated a new context negotiation, each client used a different
CGA source address, in order to force the creation of a new context
in the server. The CGA was generated with a 1024-bit public key.
1000 such contexts have been created, and the I2 processing time
measured. The x-axis shows the number of the clients (and hence
context creation requests), sorted in chronological order (context
1000 is created 1000⁄50 ms = 50 s after the first one). The figure
shows that even when a hosts has 1000 active contexts, the I2 pro-
cessing time remains at around 2 ms.
Fig. 11 shows the result of a case study of shim6 context man-
agement in our university. The netflow traces of several critical
servers in our campus have been analysed (Full IPv4 netflow). Traf-
fic was collected from the 1st to the 7th of August, 2008. In our
analysis, we assume that each peer would trigger a shim6 negoti-
ation immediately after the first packet is exchanged and that serv-
ers are configured with a garbage collection time of 10 s (that is, if
no traffic is seen during 10 s related to a particular context, then
the server decides that it is no longer used and removes it. Peers
having more than 10 s of idle time then need to renegotiate their
context). By comparing with Fig. 10, we can infer that the I2 pro-
cessing time (cost of creating a new context) would not exceed
2 ms for any of those servers. We also observe from Fig. 11 that
even in the worst case where each peer would trigger a shim6 con-
text establishment, the number of concurrent shim6 contexts that
need to be maintained is less than 800. Note that in case an admin-
istrator wants to reduce the observed number of simultaneous
Shim6 contexts, he can lower the garbage collection time, in order
to more aggressively drop Shim6 states. This tuning corresponds to
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Fig. 11. Case study of state maintenance on selected servers.
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refeed the context data through network messages.
Having just explained that servers can avoid unnecessary con-
text creation by simply disabling the shim6 heuristic, and only cre-
ate contexts upon request from the clients, one simple method that
clients could use to reduce their shim6 activity would be to intro-
duce into the heuristic ‘‘hints’’ about whether the peer supports
shim6. In particular we know that, currently, the majority of
IPv6 addresses correspond to auto-generated MAC-based ad-
dresses. Those addresses can easily be detected thanks to their for-
mat, i.e. ff:fe in the middle of the interface identifier. If the peer
uses such an address, most probably it has no support for shim6,
because the use of multiple addresses by shim6 requires their for-
mat to be either HBA or CGA. Heuristics can be implemented as a
kernel module, and a user can define his/her own (or indeed
modify the existing one), without having to modify the core imple-
mentation. So, for example, a heuristic could be defined to ignore
auto-generated addresses, or to limit to some maximum the num-
ber of simultaneous shim6 contexts.4. Open issues with Shim6 multihoming
From a standardisation viewpoint, most of the work on shim6 is
finished with several RFC’s now published [36,4,7]. Our implemen-
tation supports all the important features of shim6. However,
there are still several outstanding issues to be solved before there
will be a widespread deployment of shim6.
A primary issue is that shim6 requires IPv6. As of this writing,
the Internet still mainly uses IPv4, but given the expected exhaus-
tion of the IPv4 address space, more and more networks are seri-
ously considering IPv6 and have started deployments [24]. Shim6
could be a very useful feature for multihomed networks. Initially,
shim6 could be used for important flows such as VPN, e-commerce
or IP telephony servers where rapid recovery from link or interface
failures is important. An important advantage of shim6 over other
multihoming solutions such as HIP or SCTP, is that shim6 does not
require any change to the applications running on hosts. Thus,
applications can benefit from shim6 without being aware of it.
Simulations studies performed during the early phases of the
shim6 development have shown that host-based multihoming
techniques such as shim6 allow hosts to use many more paths to
send their packets than traditional IPv4 BGP-based multihoming
[16]. Furthermore, measurements have shown that by using these
additional paths, it is possible to achieve much better performance,
e.g. lower delays [16].
However, there are also some forces against a widespread
deployment of shim6. At present, Internet Service Providers arevery reluctant to consider it [43]. Their main concern with shim6
is that it allows hosts to influence the path used to send and re-
ceive packets towards any multihomed destination. ISP operators
have become accustomed to performing traffic engineering by
refining their BGP configurations to take into account business pol-
icies. Consequently many consider that the deployment of shim6
would limit their traffic engineering capabilities and make the net-
work more difficult to manage [43]. We disagree with such state-
ments. Shim6 provides benefits to both ISPs and their clients.
ISPs can benefit from a much more scalable interdomain routing
system while clients can benefit from a much larger number of
paths providing better performance and more redundancy.
In fact, peer-to-peer applications are also exploiting these alter-
nate paths. Network operators could market shim6 has an added
value service to their customers willing to obtain improved perfor-
mance or reliability. This service could be combined with a path
selection service provided by the ISP that allows its clients to easily
determine the best path to reach a given destination. This type of
service is already being developed to support peer-to-peer applica-
tions [1]. Recently, the IETF has chartered the ALTO working group
to work on such a service [44] which would be very useful for
shim6 to integrate with.
A second issue concerning a widespread deployment of shim6
is that many corporate networks insist on using Provider Indepen-
dent IP addresses, even for IPv6, instead of Provider Aggregatable
addresses [38]. This is because most operators consider that
renumbering a network is too complex. Despite a lot of discussions
on this topic [14], the IETF does not provide a solution to easily
renumber a corporate network. Thanks to DHCP and IPv6’s state-
less auto-configuration, most hosts can easily change their address,
but for servers and routers this remains difficult. For the specific
case of shim6, a complete renumbering solution is not necessary.
To easily support provider changes, a corporate network could
use private addresses internally (e.g. for the routers and the man-
agement servers) and simply add the prefixes allocated by their
providers to all their routers. Solutions to address this issue have
been proposed in [28].5. Related work
The closest related work are the two prototype implementa-
tions developed by Park et al. [39] and Ahrenholz and Henderson
[2]. These two implementations have also been developed on the
Linux platform. They are mainly user-space implementations with
netfilter hooks to capture the shim6 packets and process them
in user space daemons. In contrast, our implementation uses the
xfrm framework and is implemented partially in the kernel with
the non time-sensitive functions in user space. Another important
difference is that our implementation completely supports the
security mechanisms designed for shim6.
Other solutions have been developed to solve the multihoming
problem. The SCTP transport protocol [45] was initially designed to
support signaling servers in IP telephony environments. It has now
been extended to support wider deployment scenarios and is sup-
ported by several operating systems. Another example is the Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) [31]. HIP has been developed to evaluate
the benefits and drawbacks of using a new cryptographical identi-
fier namespace on top of IP. HIP has been extended to support mul-
tihoming and mobility [33] and there are several implementations
of HIP available [26]. Compared to these solutions, the main benefit
of shim6 is that it does not require any change to the applications.
This is very important for a new technique that needs to be incre-
mentally deployed.
Several years ago, based on the recommendation from [30], the
Routing Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)
1694 S. Barré et al. / Computer Communications 34 (2011) 1685–1695was rechartered to consider the evolution of the Internet architec-
ture. Several of the techniques being evaluated within this working
group [5,19,47] rely on separating the identifier and locator roles of
the IP addresses, as in shim6. Although the details between these
protocols and shim6 vary, the experience gained by the implemen-
tation and utilisation of shim6 will be beneficial for the develop-
ment of these new protocols.
For some, the issue of mobility is related to multihoming.
Briefly, mobility consists of using several addresses in sequence,
while multihoming consists of using them in parallel. Several is-
sues are shared by both approaches as raised by Bagnulo et al.
[8]. One of the authors (Barré), has evaluated a similar approach
to [8] for managing mobility and multihoming in one shared solu-
tion. This resulted as well in a new implementation based on Lin-
Shim6, called MipShim6 [13].
Finally, recently an IETF working group has been created (MPT-
CP) to design a modified version of TCP, called Multipath TCP [22],
that is able to failover from one path to another, and to spread one
single transport flow across several paths. This is achieved by
appropriately rethinking the congestion control algorithms. This
is a promising approach to achieve better resource pooling in the
Internet [48]. The architecture of the new MPTCP protocol [21]
supports any technology that is able to expose multiple paths to
the end-host, shim6 being one of them. One of us (Barré) is also
the author of the reference implementation for MPTCP [10].
Although the IETF requested that such a reference implementation
be independent of Shim6, the multipath version of LinShim6 (see
Section 3.1) can be plugged into that implementation to provide
a path management service for the MPTCP transport layer.
6. Conclusion
Multihoming is one of the problems that limits the scalability of
the current Internet architecture, because it is currently obtained
through injection of additional routes in the BGP system. In this pa-
per, we have described and evaluated our implementation in the
Linux kernel of the shim6 host-based multihoming technique
developed within the IETF. We have first explained the basics of
this technique including the defined security mechanisms. Then,
we detailed the architecture of our LinShim6 implementation
along with the motivations for our main design choices. We have
then evaluated the performance impact of the main security mech-
anisms of shim6. Finally, we have discussed the issues that remain
open for a widespread deployment of shim6, while recognising
that LinShim6 is currently the only complete and publicly available
shim6 implementation. The modularity of LinShim6 has been
shown already by its applications to mobility and multipath. This
efficient, modular kernel architecture can be reused in the design
of future protocols based on locator/id separation.
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